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Este trabajo extiende la metodología propuesta por primera vez por Ahmad y Stern para el 
diseño de reformas tributarias que son óptimas en el margen. La extensión tiene que ver con una 
aproximación más precisa de las medidas de bienestar. Las variantes del enfoque son 
contrastadas en el caso del actual sistema tributario mexicano.  
 
 
  ABSTRACT 
 
This paper extends the methodology first proposed by Ahmad and Stern for the design of tax 
reforms that are optimal at the margin. The extension centers on a sharper approximation of 
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  1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many theoretical papers have been written over the years on the theory of optimal taxation (the 
classic reference is, of course, Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). However, somewhat 
paradoxically, most of the results in that area are of little relevance for economic policy-makers. 
This is so because the theory of optimal taxation imposes a large set of informational 
requirements that are unlikely to be met in practice. In particular, one needs to have reliable 
estimates of how behavioral responses change in responses to all possible taxes and 
redistribution of incomes, and this for all the representative agents in the economy, be them 
consumers or producers. 
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that several authors have proposed over the years 
simpler approaches that might serve as guides in the design of optimal tax systems. One of 
these, the model to be analyzed here, is known as the marginal tax reform methodology, first 
advanced by Ahmad and Stern (1984) [AS, from now on]. As will be reviewed in the next 
section, these authors assess the local impact of a tax reform by using first-order 
approximations of the relevant variables. Hence, their approach merely requires information 
about actual data (not fitted values), and aggregate rather than individual demand responses. 
The attractiveness of such an extreme simplification is attested by a number of 
empirical papers that have applied that methodology over the years. Apart from the study on 
India that is included in AS, their approach has been replicated in the case of Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Ireland, and Pakistan by, respectively, Decoster and Schokkaert (1990), 
Cragg (l991), Kaiser and Spahn (1989), Madden (1995), and Ahmad and Stern (1991).   3
Yet, as it has been forcefully argued in a general context by Banks, Blundell and 
Lewbel (1996), the measurement of social welfare through the use of first-order 
approximations, as it is the case for the AS methodology, may lead to systematic biases. As 
noted by Banks et al. (1996, p. 1228), 
“Typically, the price or tax changes that are of the greatest policy interest are 
those involving substantial rather than marginal changes in price. In these 
cases substitution effects can be non-trivial. The marginal (i.e., first order) 
approximations ignore these effects, and therefore, can be seriously biased.” 
 
  Taking note of this admonition, it is the purpose of this paper to extend the AS 
marginal tax analysis by means of sharper approximations of welfare measures, in order to have 
a more robust approach for evaluating tax reforms. Toward that end, the next section reviews the 
key issues involved in the AS methodology, and the third section presents our extended analysis. 
Finally, the fourth section illustrates the variants to the approach using as an example the current 
Mexican tax system. 
 
  2. THE AHMAD-STERN MODEL 
 
According to AS, the optimality of an indirect tax structure may be evaluated by comparing 
the marginal cost, in terms of social welfare, of raising an extra unit of revenue by means of a 
tax increase on each good. Optimality requires that the marginal social welfare cost should be 
equal for all the relevant goods. Otherwise a Pareto improvement could be easily implemented 
by lowering the excise tax on the good with the higher marginal cost and by raising the tax on 
the good with the lower marginal cost.   4
In order to be more precise about that criterion, we present here the model considered 
in Ahmad and Stern (1984). On the production side, we simply assume that all prices are fixed 
and that there are constant returns to scale. Hence, indirect tax changes are only reflected as 
consumer price changes and there are no profits; although this simple model, it should be 
noted in passing, could be enriched to account for inelastic supplies and/or direct taxation (as 
in, e.g., Ahmad and Stern, 1991). 
There are I goods indexed by i = 1, 2,..., I, while p denotes the corresponding (fixed) 
producer price vector. Thus, if t is the vector of specific taxes, then q = p + t is the final 
consumer price vector. There are, furthermore, H households indexed by h = 1, 2,..., H. For 
each household h, the consumption bundle that maximizes utility u
h(x
h) subject to the 
corresponding linear budget constraint will be denoted as x
h(q,m
h), while the associated 
indirect utility function will be expressed as v
h(q,m
h).  
We also assume the existence of a social welfare function  ) ,..., (
H 1 u u W , which can be 
rewritten in terms of prices and incomes as: 
 
)) , ( ),..., , ( ( ) ,..., , (
1 1 H H 1 H m v m v W m m V q q q =                                       (1) 
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we can calculate the government tax revenue as: 
   5
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Now suppose that the excise tax on good i is to be increased at the margin. Given 
equations (1) and (2), the marginal social cost of that tax increase may be defined as the 
corresponding marginal decrease in social welfare relative to the corresponding marginal 
increase in government revenue. More formally, the marginal social cost of a marginal tax 
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where the negative sign on the right-hand side of (3) is needed to make positive the marginal 
social cost. This is so because ∂ V/∂ ti will always be negative, and, furthermore, we would 
expect in general ∂ R/∂ ti to be positive (although a commodity-specific Laffer effect cannot be 
ruled out a priori). 
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where the first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the private marginal utility of 
income. Let us now consider its social counterpart: the social marginal utility of income of 
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We shall have to say more about these functions soon, but at this point we may note that each 
h β  may be thought as a welfare weight, since, using the last two equations, the numerator in 
(3) can be written as the negative of the sum across households of the consumption of good i, 
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In a similar fashion, taking the partial derivative with respect to ti in (2), the impact on 
government revenue of a marginal increase in the excise tax is found to be 
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where ε ki is the uncompensated cross-price elasticity of the aggregate demand for good k with 
respect to price i.   7
Finally, after defining τk = tk /qk (the proportion of the tax on good k relative to the 
consumer price), we can then use equations (3), (5) and (6) to find the marginal social cost of 
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An extensive discussion of the meaning of this expression is given in Ahmad and Stern (1984, 
p. 265). For our purposes, it suffices to note that in order to apply the AS methodology, which 
requires computing and comparing each marginal social cost across the I goods, we would just 
need the following data: the final consumer prices, the welfare weights for all households, the 
consumption levels, and the aggregate demand responses (as represented by cross-price 
elasticities). 
Thus, it does not seem to be necessary to estimate a full demand system. However, this 
last appreciation would be correct only if the welfare weights defined in (4) were independent 
of prices. Ahmad and Stern were, of course, fully aware of that fact and so they assumed in 
their paper, as is commonly done in most of the applied papers on the subject, that the indirect 
social welfare function could be locally approximated by a function independent of prices and 
only dependent on incomes. 
More specifically, the AS methodology makes use at this point of the following 
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where e is a nonnegative parameter that reflects the degree of aversion to social inequality, k is a 
constant of normalization, and where in applied work the arguments of the function may be 
taken to be, say, total expenditure per household. Also note that each of the terms in the sum 
becomes a natural log function when e = 1. 
  Using definition (4) in (8), each social marginal utility of income 
h β  may be calculated 
by taking the derivative of the social indirect utility function with respect to m
h. Furthermore, 
the authors suggest, the constant k may be chosen in such a way that the welfare weight for the 
poorest household is equal to one (and hence marginal social values are always relative to the 
poorest household). That is to say, assuming that households are ordered according to their 
ascending incomes total expenditures, the welfare weight for household h would be given by 
e h h m m ) / (
1 = β . Thus, for instance, when e = 0, the social marginal utility of income is equal to 
one for all households and there is no aversion to social inequality, while if, say, e = 1, then a 
household with an income twice as large as the poorest would have a social marginal utility half 
as large. That is, as the parameter of inequality aversion is increased, the relative weight of the 
poorest household is increased as well (until the limit, when we reach the Rawlsian criterion of 
measuring social welfare only in terms of the well-being of the poorest). 
  It is important to note, however, that the assumption of independence of prices that lies 
behind (8) is quite restrictive. Indeed, as shown by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996,   9
Theorem 1), the welfare weights defined in (4) are independent of prices if and only if the 
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for some functions a
h and constants κ
h. To see how restrictive this last condition is, extend (8) 
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According to that theorem, the only members in the Bergson class that would have welfare 
weights independent of prices would be the ones for which each indirect utility function is 
multiplicatively separable in prices and income, and for which the parameter of inequality 
aversion is equal to one. Thus, in the particular case of (8) the local approximation argument is 
formally correct only when e is near to one. 
It is time to conclude with the review of the methodology put forward by Ahmad and 
Stern (1984). As it is clear from the presentation above, the AS approach is neatly tied and 
very easy to apply, thus providing a simple guideline for tax reforms (an application will be 
given in Section 4 below). But, as it was stressed earlier, a fragile aspect of the AS 
methodology is its local character. The own authors were fully aware of this fact, as it is 
illustrated by the following quote: “We do not argue that our methods are robust with respect   10
to parameter estimates and model specification, and one should not expect them to be so” 
(Ahmad and Stern, 1984, p. 295).  
 
  3. AN ALGEBRAIC EXTENSION 
 
Given that all tax reforms are far from being marginal, it would be interesting to extend the AS 
methodology using at least second-order approximations as recommended by Banks, Blundell 
and Lewbel (1996). In our context, such an extension requires that, both, the numerator and 
the denominator in (3) be replaced by sharper approximations. 
More formally, we would like to compute for each good the approximate impact on 
welfare that would have a tax increase that is small, but not marginal. That is, in principle, we 
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and where, as usual, by q-i is meant the vector that includes all the elements of q except for the i-
th component.  
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where, for each household h, the first elasticity inside the parentheses refers to the price 
elasticity of the welfare weight, while the second one refers to the own-price elasticity of 
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  Thus, after simplifying (12) and (13), the following variant to the Ahmad-Stern 
approach is suggested in this paper: To analyze, for each of the goods, the approximate impact 
on social welfare that would have a tax increase that is small, but not necessarily marginal, 
instead of the first-order approximation given in equation (7) above, use the following second-
order approximation: 
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  Note that the numerator on the right-hand side of equation (14) contains the price 
elasticity of each welfare weight, so that the measure suggested in this paper requires, in 
general, the estimation of the full demand system. This result is not surprising. Indeed, it 
seems even natural once one takes into account the main message given by Banks et al. 
(1996).  
If, at the risk of losing theoretical soundness and numerical precision, one wants to 
simplify (14) to allow for a comparison with the AS approach, one can continue using as a local 
approximation the Atkinson social indirect utility function given in (8). In such a case, the 
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Note that aside from the fact that (15) is more realistic than (7), insofar as it allows for 
non-marginal tax changes, both equations are similar in terms of their informational 
requirements. The only difference is that now (15) requires estimates of the own-price 
elasticities of household demands (all the terms of the form 
h
ii ε ), which would seem to be a   13
daunting task. Although it is unlikely to have that information even when the full demand 
system is estimated (given the lack of this type of panel data in most countries), one could use 
instead the average demand responses in each income decile, as it is done in the next section. 
Furthermore; if one does not count with that information either, then one could use as a proxy 
the own-price elasticity of aggregate demand. 
 
4. AN APPLICATION TO MEXICO USING BOTH APPROACHES 
 
Regarding the Mexican economy, Urzúa (1994 and 2001) provided the first studies that 
attempted to estimate the welfare consequences of several indirect tax reforms enacted by the 
Mexican Congress in the nineties. Following the work by King (1983), those papers relied on 
the estimation of full-demand systems and were based on the income and expenditure surveys 
made by the government in 1989 and 1994, respectively. The Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) was used in both papers, after taking care of the fact 
that expenditures could be zero for some goods, and after making use, in the case of Urzúa 
(2001), of the generalized method of moments to allow for a more flexible demand system. 
  More recently, Campos (2002), in his Master’s thesis, has also followed King’s 
approach to analyze the social impact of several potential tax reforms that have been discussed 
in the political arena over the last few years. Although the main purpose of his thesis is only 
tangentially related to our purposes, we can still make use of some of his estimates of 
consumption levels and elasticities to provide an example of how to use the AS methodology 
and its variant.   14
  The demand system estimated by Campos is termed the Quadratic Almost Ideal 
Demand System (QUAIDS), and is due to Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). It nests the 
AIDS system, although it also allows for quadratic Engel curves, a feature that seems to match 
observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers and households. 
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where ui is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
2 σ , and where 
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We have to impose, as usual, three conditions on the parameters to make the model given above 
a bona fide demand system: adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry. The expressions for those 
constraints can be found in Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997), but for our purposes it is of 
more interest to present here expressions for the QUAIDS model elasticities. As shown by,   15
those authors, the uncompensated price elasticities, the ones that are required in the AS 
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  Campos estimated the model by three-step nonlinear least squares, using as data set the 
income and expenditure survey of 10,108 households made by the government in the year 2000 
(INEGI, 2001). The author aggregated the consumption goods reported in that survey to obtain 
just five composite goods, using as the composition criterion the differential treatment accorded 
by Mexican tax laws to the value added tax. The implied prices were calculated as the weighted 
mean of the prices involved, using as weights the relative expenditures. A brief description of 
those five composite goods is given in the first two columns of Table 1 below. 
  The other five columns in that table present the uncompensated cross-price elasticities 
that were obtained by that author (all of them statistically significant). Although there is no need 
to reproduce here the income elasticities implied by the model, it may be of interest to note that 





                      Composite Goods and Uncompensated Cross-Price Elasticities*
Composite goods 12345
  Good 1: Non-processed food and dairy products -0.636 0.033 0.013 0.260 0.152
  Good 2: Processed food, clothing and appliances -0.026 -0.672 0.012 -0.027 -0.041
  Good 3: Alcoholic beverages and tobacco -0.062 0.038 -0.816 0.295 2.140
  Good 4: Medicines -0.255 -0.608 0.022 -1.032 -0.185
  Good 5: Education -0.106 -0.289 -0.031 -0.218 -0.955
* Source: Campos (2002, tables 3 and 5).    17
food; processed food, clothing and appliances; and alcoholic beverages and tobacco. On the 
other hand, medicines and education were found to be luxuries. 
  Using Table 1, we are now ready to illustrate the AS approach and the variant suggested 
in this paper. It is important to remember, as noted in the last section, that in order to allow for a 
direct comparison between both approaches we will make use here of Atkinson’s function, given 
in equation (8) above, since the AS approach assumes that the indirect social welfare function is 
independent of prices. Thus, although our variant not only allows but even calls for the use of 
indirect functions dependent on prices, such as the general Bergsonian family cited earlier, here 
we will sacrifice theoretical soundness for the sake of comparison. But it almost goes without 
saying that, because of the use of (15) instead of (14), we should expect that the numerical 
differences resulting from (15) and (7) will be minor. 
  Regarding the tax changes to be considered here, the attention will be centered on the 
value-added tax (VAT), although a similar exercise could be made in the case of other excise 
taxes (such as the so-called IEPS on tobacco and alcoholic beverages). As a first step, it should 
be noted that in Mexico the VAT rate for the case of non-processed food, medicines and 
education is currently equal to zero, while the VAT rate for processed food (as well as for 
clothing and appliances) and for alcoholic beverages (including tobacco) is equal to 15%. It 
should also be noted that in our model tk is by construction a quantity tax (i.e., a tax per unit of 
consumption of good k), not an ad-valorem tax.  Thus, given a VAT rate of 15%, the 
corresponding τk (the proportion of the tax on good k relative to the consumer price) equals 
13%. 
  Making use now of the elasticities given in Table 1, as well as of raw data on prices, 
consumption levels and aggregate demand responses, all of them classified by deciles, Table 2   18
presents the marginal social cost of raising an extra revenue by increasing the tax on each 
composite good, using the expression for each λ i given in (7). The results are given for four 
different levels of inequality aversion: from e=0, when there is no aversion whatsoever, to e=3, 
when the welfare of the poorest has a substantial relative weight in the social welfare function. It 
is usually argued that e should oscillate between one and two, and so the corresponding results 
for those two values are also reported. 
  As can be seen from Table 2, when there is no inequality aversion the preferred good to 
be taxed is the one composed by alcoholic beverages and tobacco. But once the parameter is 
increased the preferred choice becomes education. Therefore, as the concern about the poorest 
takes more importance, one has to shift from “sin taxes” to taxes on education. 
  This last result should be interpreted with extreme care, however, since in this type of 
models education is wrongly put on the same footing as mere consumption. That is, the model 
does not take into consideration the fact that the social return on education is certainly larger 
than the private return. For instance, the spillovers from education may arise from positive 
externalities across workers and/or endogenous skill-based technical change (see, respectively, 
Lucas, 1988, and Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000). 
  Table 2 also presents the results obtained when we use second-order approximations to 
compute each Λ i in (15), after assuming a uniform increase of $2 in the quantity taxes for all 
goods (that magnitude was chosen since it represented an increase from 0% to about 10% in the 
case of the average price of good 1). The price change was taken to be the same across goods to 
make a fair comparison with the results obtained using (7), but, of course, one of the advantages 
of (15) over (7) is that now the goods could be accorded a differential tax treatment!   19
                                                   Table 2
                                 Marginal and Approximate Social Welfare Costs  
Degree of inequality aversion
Marginal and approximate social cost 
e = 0e = 1e = 2e = 3
   Non-processed food and dairy products
λ 1      1.018 0.125 0.051 0.040
Λ 1 1.062 0.129 0.053 0.041
   Processed food, clothing and appliances
λ 2     1.096 0.055 0.008 0.004
Λ 2 1.088 0.054 0.008 0.004
   Alcoholic beverages and tobacco
λ 3     0.869 0.098 0.044 0.036
Λ 3 0.851 0.096 0.043 0.035
   Medicines
λ 4     1.022 0.059 0.011 0.006
Λ 4 0.988 0.057 0.010 0.006
   Education
λ 5     1.021 0.035 0.004 0.001
Λ 5 0.992 0.034 0.003 0.001  20
  It should be noted that even though both variants suggest the same optimal way to raise 
revenue, the ranking of the social costs is not always the same for both methods. Consider, for 
instance, the two different rankings that are given in Table 2 for the case of composite goods 1 
and 2 (whether or not this difference is statistically significant would be very hard to verify, 
though, given the complex functional forms of both lambdas). 
  Before closing this section, it may be interesting to address here what is known in the 
literature on optimal taxation as the “inverse optimum” problem. In our context, this problem 
could be encapsulated in the following question: If we were to assume that the actual tax 
structure is optimal, what is the implied degree of inequality aversion in Mexico?  
  The answer to that question can be derived after noting that optimality requires that the 
first-order or second-order approximations of social costs should be the same for all composite 
goods, five in our case. That is, in our example the corresponding five equations should all be 
set equal to some fixed λ  if we make use of (7), or to some fixed Λ  if we use (15) instead. In 
both cases the inequality aversion parameter e will be an exponent in the welfare weights: 
e h h m m ) / (
1 = β , and we can proceed to estimate the aversion parameter and the corresponding 
lambda using nonlinear ordinary least squares. For instance, in the case of the AS methodology, 
the implied nonlinear regression to be estimated is of the form 
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for each of the five composite goods.   21
  The corresponding estimates obtained in that fashion are very similar in both cases: λ  = 
0.717 and e = 0.125 if we use equation (7), and Λ  = 0.721 and e = 0.121 if we use equation (15). 
These results have to be interpreted with care since there are only five observations, and, 
furthermore, the corresponding t-statistics are not significant in either case. Yet, if are willing 
to jump to a conclusion with such a few observations, the moral to be drawn is worrisome: the 
implied inequality aversion is quite low in the case of Mexico. To put it in another way, the 




This paper has presented a variant to the marginal tax analysis first put forward by Ahmad and 
Stern two decades ago. The variant, as given in equation (14), recognizes that welfare weights 
do depend on prices, and that tax reforms involve more than marginal changes and include 
differential treatments across goods. The paper also presented an example based on the 
Mexican tax system, after simplifying (14) to (15) to allow for a fair comparison with the AS 
approach (which implicitly, and wrongly, assumes that the indirect social welfare function 
does not depend on prices). 
As a final remark, we should note that the approach suggested here should be used only 
as a preliminary analysis that can shed some light on optimal tax changes across goods. After 
such directions are identified, then the analysis should be complemented with a systemic one 
of the type proposed by King (1983), which makes use of equivalent incomes to make global 
welfare comparisons among different tax regimes.   22
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